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Abstract
Despite economists’ nearly universal support for free trade policies, the general
public has serious reservations about free trade.  To understand this opposition, one must
understand the preferences of individuals as they relate to the policy choices of
policymakers.  Ideally, one would like to know how these preferences differ across
regions because legislators who represent their constituents in the U.S. Congress cast the
actual votes on trade policies.  The present study produces estimates by state of trade
preferences linked directly to individual preferences.
Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) found that the lower the skill level of a worker, the
stronger the support for additional trade restrictions.  I generate estimates by state for
1992 and 1996 using Scheve and Slaughter’s estimates.  The estimates are generated in
two steps.  First, an average level of educational attainment for each state is constructed.
Second, this educational attainment variable is inserted into Scheve and Slaughter’s
estimate of the relationship between educational attainment and an individual’s support
for additional trade restrictions to produce an average probability of state support for
additional trade restrictions.
Generally speaking, states in the South have the highest levels of support for
additional trade restrictions.  Support for additional trade restrictions is lower in 1996
than in 1992.  A verdict on the usefulness of these estimates has yet to be delivered;
however, in the context of voting on NAFTA by U.S. Senators the estimates for 1992
yield plausible results.
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Trade Policy Opinions at the State Level
INTRODUCTION
Despite economists’ nearly universal support for free trade policies, the general
public has serious reservations about free trade.  To understand the opposition to free
trade, one must understand the preferences of individuals as they relate to the policy
choices available to policymakers.  A recent study by Scheve and Slaughter (2001a),
which focuses on individual preferences, found that the lower the skill level of a worker,
the stronger the support for new trade barriers.
Scheve and Slaughter’s result is consistent with a Heckscher-Ohlin trade model in
which the United States is well endowed with skilled labor.  In such a world, according to
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, policy changes removing international trade barriers that
stimulate inter-industry trade would tend to increase the incomes of skilled labor.
Meanwhile, trade liberalization would likely be detrimental to the incomes of unskilled
labor.
1  As a result, the incomes of unskilled labor would fall further behind those of
skilled labor.
2
In the context of trade policy determination, one would like to know how these
preferences differ across regions because legislators who represent their constituents in
the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives cast the actual votes on trade policies.  By
using Scheve and Slaughter’s estimates for individuals, I generate estimates by state for
                                                
1 Factors other than those based on economic self-interest might come into play.  See Coughlin (2002) for a
discussion of evidence highlighting the potential importance of other considerations.
2 Since the mid-1970s, Sapir (2000) notes an increasing wage disparity between skilled and unskilled
workers in the United States.  In addition, between 1973 and 1997 the median real weekly earnings of male,
full-time workers declined from $700 to $600 using 1997 dollars.2
1992 and 1996.
3  To my knowledge, no one has produced regional estimates of trade
preferences linked directly to individual preferences.
To set the stage for my analysis, in the next section I review the aspects of Scheve
and Slaughter’s analysis that provide the foundation for my estimates.  In the subsequent
section, I produce estimates of the average probability that a region supports additional
trade restrictions.  These estimates are examined to see whether the support for additional
restrictions by a specific region is associated with the support by its neighbors.   I
complete this section by generating estimates of the percentage of a region’s population
likely to support additional trade restrictions.  To generate evidence on the usefulness of
my estimates, in the final section of the body of this paper I examine voting by U.S.
Senators on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  A summary
completes the paper.
INDIVIDUAL OPINIONS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE RESTRICTIONS
Rodrik (1995) stressed that an essential element of any political-economy model
of trade policy is a description of individual preferences pertaining to the policy options
available to policymakers.
4  By describing individual preferences, a recent study by
Scheve and Slaughter (2001b) is a major improvement over previous studies that
generally use observed political actions to make inferences about trade-policy
preferences.  Lacking direct information on individual preferences, such inferences are
                                                
3 When data on educational attainment are released as part of the 2000 Census, estimates by congressional
district will be generated.  The data are scheduled for release during spring 2002.
4 Rodrik (1995) identified other essential elements.  To complete the “demand side” the model must explain
how individual preferences are aggregated into political demands for a specific policy.  Interest groups play
a key role in translating preferences into demands.  With respect to the “supply side” the model must
characterize the preferences of policymakers and then specify the institutional setting in which policy takes
place.  In addition, trade policies in one country are generally interdependent with trade policies in other
countries.3
problematic because policy preferences and institutions jointly determine policy actions.
Thus, the mapping from preferences to actions is not unique.
Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) use data from the 1992 and 1996 National Election
Studies surveys to examine the determinants of individual preferences about trade
policy.
5  The following question was posed in the survey to assess individual preferences:
“Some people have suggested placing new limits on foreign imports in order to
protect American jobs.  Others say that such limits would raise consumer prices
and hurt American exports.  Do you favor or oppose placing new limits on
imports, or haven’t you thought much about this?”
Responses of those favoring additional trade restrictions were coded as 1, while
responses of those opposing additional trade barriers were coded as 0.  Based on a sample
of 1736 observations in 1992, 67 percent of respondents favored additional trade
restrictions and 33 percent opposed them.  By 1996 support for additional trade barriers
had diminished somewhat.  Based on a sample of 846 observations in that year, 53
percent favored additional trade restrictions and 47 percent opposed them.
    The National Election Studies surveys also recorded many details about
individual respondents.  This information allowed Scheve and Slaughter to explore how
individual preferences about trade policy were related to educational attainment,
occupation, industry of employment, and county of residence.  I focus on how
educational attainment affects trade-policy preferences.  Table 1 shows the results of
Scheve and Slaughter’s logistic regressions examining the relationship between
educational attainment and support for additional trade restrictions using 1992 and 1996
                                                
5 Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) also use the National Election Studies survey to examine immigration
policy.4
data.  The results support the hypothesis that individuals’ skill levels determine trade-
policy preferences.
6
Using the estimated equations for 1992 and 1996 to generate expected values for
trade-policy preferences yields some interesting results.  In 1992 average educational
attainment was 13.29 years; this value generates an expected value of 0.68 for the
average individual’s trade opinion.
7  Thus, the average individual in 1992 had a strong
preference for imposing new trade restrictions.  In 1996 average educational attainment
was 13.87 years, producing an expected trade opinion of 0.54.
Clearly, the average individual was less supportive of additional trade restrictions
in 1996 than in 1992.  Some of the decline might be due to increased educational
attainment; however, such an explanation is, at most, only a partial explanation.  If one
uses average educational attainment in 1996 in the estimated equation for 1992, the
expected trade opinion is 0.65.  A standard finding in the trade-policy literature is that
macroeconomic conditions affect the demand for protectionist actions.
8  Scheve and
Slaughter’s results support the view that the state of the macroeconomic economy had an
affect on individuals’ trade-policy preferences.  Few would dispute the assessment that
macroeconomic conditions were better in 1996 than in 1992.  For example, the average
unemployment rate was 7.5 percent during 1992 and 5.4 percent during 1996.
                                                
6 Regressions using occupation wage, an alternative measure of skill, as the independent variable produced
additional support for the importance of skill levels in determining trade-policy preferences.
7 The expected value of an individual’s trade opinion is defined as follows: E(Trade OpinionI) = Pr(Trade
OpinionI = 1|π I) = π I, where I indexes each observation and π I equals the probability that an individual
supports trade restrictions.  Using the logistic distribution, π I = 1/(1 + exp(-xIβ )).
8 See Rodrik (1995), Coughlin et al. (1989), and Bohara and Kaempfer (1991) for additional references and
analyses dealing with this issue.  For example, Bohara and Kaempfer found that U.S. tariffs were Granger-
caused by unemployment, real gross national product, and inflation.5
SUPPPORT FOR ADDITIONAL TRADE RESTRICTIONS: STATE ESTIMATES
Producing state estimates is straightforward.  An estimate for average educational
attainment in each region was generated for 1992 and 1996.  This estimate was then used
to calculate an average probability using the estimated equations in Table 1.
State Estimates of Educational Attainment
Based on the March supplement of the Current Population Survey, I created an
average level of education for each state.  First, the Survey’s educational attainment
variable was converted to measures of completed education in years.  The conversion
assumptions are listed in Table 2.  Not surprisingly, I think all the assumptions are
justified; however, I would like to make a few remarks about some specific assumptions.
Responses of  “None,” “First-Fourth Grade,” “Fifth-Sixth Grade,” and “Seventh-
Eighth Grade” were all assigned eight years of completed education.  A possibility of
upward bias exists.  In light of the small percentage of responses in the first three of these
four categories; however, this assumption does not affect the estimates materially.
Responses of “Ninth Grade,” “Tenth Grade,” and “Eleventh Grade” were assigned 9, 10,
and 11 years of completed education.  In many cases the students likely dropped out at
some point in the following school year, so it is possible that there is some downward
bias in the educational attainment measure.  Similar to the preceding case, the bias is
likely to be quite small.  “Some College, but No Degree” was assigned 13 years.  In this
case the bias could be in either direction.  Some students leave before completing
successfully their first year of college, while others leave after completing more than one
year.  Another source of potential bias arises due to the possibility that some individuals
have multiple master’s degrees or a master’s degree and a doctorate in different fields.  In6
both cases the assignments of 18 and 20 years, respectively, understates the years of
completed education; however, the degree of bias is likely to be small because of the
small percentage of the population falling into these categories.
Given the preceding assumptions, the focus was restricted to people 25 and older.
Then, using the weights of each category based on the Survey’s results, I calculated a
weighted average years of completed education for each state.
9
State Estimates of Support for Additional Trade Restrictions
Inserting the estimates for educational attainment into the equations listed in
Table 1 produces the results for individual states, plus the District of Columbia, listed in
Table 3.  A ranking of the estimated probabilities from highest (1) to lowest (51) is
provided in parentheses.  The estimated average probability across states ranges from
0.677 in Colorado to 0.743 in West Virginia.  This range of probabilities that an average
individual in a state supports additional trade restrictions reflects a range of an average
educational attainment of 13.39 years in Colorado to 11.92 years in West Virginia.  Thus,
average educational attainment in Colorado exceeded the high school diploma level
attained in West Virginia by roughly 1.5 years.  The District of Columbia, which has the
highest average educational attainment in 1992 of 13.51 years, has the lowest average
probability of supporting additional trade restrictions, 0.672.
The estimates for 1992 reveal an average opinion across all regions of 0.706,
which exceeds the average opinion of 0.671 in the National Election Studies survey.
Thus, my estimates tend to show stronger protectionist sentiments than those in Scheve
and Slaughter (2001a).  The reason is that the average educational attainment of the
                                                
9 These results are available upon request.7
respondents in the National Elections Studies surveys exceeds that of the 25 and older
population in the United States that was used to produce my estimates.  For example,
average educational attainment for the survey respondents was 13.29 in 1992, while the
simple average across the regions in Table 3 was 12.77.  Another way to see the
difference is that 92 percent of the survey sample had a high school degree or more in
1992, while in the United States as a whole 79 percent had a high school degree or more.
An alternative presentation of the results for 1992 (Table 3) is contained in Figure
1.  The map, based on quartiles, reveals a clustering of protectionist sentiment.  In other
words, a state with a high degree of protectionist sentiment is likely to be located near
other states with high degrees of protectionist sentiment and a state with a low degree is
likely to be located near other states with low degrees of protectionist sentiment.  One
way to measure this spatial autocorrelation is by Moran’s I.  This statistic, which in most
cases ranges from –1 to +1, is 0.5 in 1992.  Such a value indicates a high degree of
positive spatial autocorrelation.
This clustering of protectionist sentiment reflects the fact that educational
attainment tends to be similar for clusters of states.  Figure 1 shows that the South tends
to have the highest levels of average support for additional trade restrictions.  These
results are consistent with the existing, albeit scarce, information on trade opinions for
specific regions.  For example, Sarpolus (2000) found that respondents from Southern
states were less likely to approve of free trade agreements than were respondents from
other states.
Turning to the results for 1996 presented in Table 3, one sees that the estimated
average probability across states ranges from 0.561 in Colorado to 0.651 in West8
Virginia.  This range is slightly larger than the range estimated for 1992.  Identical to
1992, the District of Columbia has the lowest average probability of supporting
additional trade restrictions, 0.555.
The average probabilities of support in 1996 for additional trade restrictions are
lower than in 1992.  For example, the average of the 51 regions is 0.600 in 1996, a
decline from 0.706 in 1992.  As discussed previously, the better macroeconomic
conditions in 1996 relative to 1992 likely account for some of the decline in support for
additional trade restrictions.  In addition, average educational attainment tended to rise.
For example, in Colorado average educational attainment rose to 13.56 years in 1996
from 13.39 years in 1992.  Similarly, in West Virginia average educational attainment
rose to 12.20 years from 11.92 years.
Figure 2 shows the results for 1996 presented in Table 2.  Similar to 1992, the
map reveals a clustering of protectionist sentiment.  The clustering in 1996, however, is
not as pronounced as in 1992.  Moran’s I for 1996 is 0.4, down from 0.5 in 1992.
Southern portions of the United States continue to have the highest levels of average
support for additional trade restrictions.
Another way to use the regression results of Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) is to
calculate the educational attainment level that would produce a probability of 0.5 for
supporting additional trade restrictions.
10  These levels are 16.8 years of education for
1992 and 14.4 years for 1996.  Next, calculate the percentage of a region’s population
that produces a probability of 0.5 or higher.  Obviously, the rest of a region’s population
can be viewed as opposing additional trade restrictions.  These percentages are presented
                                                
10 A probability of 0.5 can be viewed as the point dividing supporters of additional trade restrictions from
opponents.9
in Table 4.  All states in 1992 have support percentages of 89 percent or more.  The
District of Columbia is somewhat of an outlier with a support percentage of only 81
percent.  The average of all regions is 93 percent.  By 1996, the support percentages,
while still large in absolute terms, had declined substantially.  No state had a support
percentage exceeding 86 percent and 17 regions, with the District of Columbia leading
with 34 percent, had opposition percentages exceeding 25 percent.
STATE TRADE POLICY OPINIONS AND VOTING ON NAFTA
A reasonable question is whether the preceding estimates contribute to knowledge
about voting on trade policy.  To generate evidence on the usefulness of the estimates
reported in Table 3, I examine voting by U.S. Senators on NAFTA.  Numerous voting
models have been proposed and estimated.
11  Generally speaking, these studies estimate a
single equation that relies on either logit or probit specifications.
Numerous variables have been used in these voting model studies.  One category
of variables attempts to control for the fact that certain industries and factors of
production were expected to benefit from the passage of NAFTA, while other industries
and factors were expected to suffer.  The economic interests of constituents have been
found to affect the voting behavior of their representatives in most voting model studies.
A second category of variables attempts to control for the ideology of the representative.
The ideology of a representative is likely to reflect those of his/her constituents.  A third
category of variables attempts to control for the political party of the representative.  The
Democratic and Republican parties have had opposing views on trade issues for many
years.  A final category of variables attempts to control for campaign contributions by10
organized interest groups.  Contributions by political action committees (PACs) are likely
to affect, as well as be affected by, the voting behavior of senators.
In the present illustration, I rely on a model by Baldwin and Magee (2000).
12  In
their model, a senator’s vote on NAFTA is expected to be influenced by economic
interests, ideology, and campaign contributions.  One of their innovations involves the
treatment of campaign contributions.  Campaign contributions are likely to affect a
senator’s vote on NAFTA.  In addition, a senator’s expected vote on NAFTA may have
affected the amount of contributions the senator received.  Because of this bi-directional
relationship between campaign contributions and voting, Baldwin and Magee estimate
separate equations for contributions from business and labor PACs to avoid biased
estimates of the impacts of these contributions on senators’ votes.
Baldwin and Magee’s estimates of the determinants of U.S. Senate voting on
NAFTA are reported in variant 1 in Table 5.
13  Generally speaking, labor interests
opposed NAFTA because of concerns that NAFTA would have adverse effects on the
jobs and earnings of labor, especially those with low skills.  On the other hand, business
interests supported NAFTA because of the opportunities associated with larger markets
and the potential reductions in costs due to gains in efficiency.
The results show that ideology was not a statistically significant determinant of
voting by senators on NAFTA.  The results for two proxies are reported.  AFL-CIO, an
ideological rating by the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial
Organizations is expected to be related negatively to votes in favor of  NAFTA.
                                                                                                                                                
11 Examples include Baldwin and Magee (2000), Kang and Greene (1999), Kamdar and Gonzalez (1998),
Thorbecke (1997), Conybeare and Zinkula (1996), and Kahane (1996).
12 Special thanks are due Christopher Magee for providing data and programs.
13 The estimates of the contributions equations are omitted.  See Baldwin and Magee (2000, Table 6).11
Chamber of Commerce, an ideological rating by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, is
expected to be related positively to votes in favor of  NAFTA.  Neither proxy is
statistically significant.
In contrast to ideology, both measures of contributions from PACs are statistically
significant and possess the hypothesized relationships with senators’ votes.  Labor
contributions, which are PAC contributions from organized labor interests, are related
negatively to votes in favor of NAFTA.  Business contributions, which are PAC
contributions from organized business interests, are related positively to votes in favor of
NAFTA.
Measures for the economic interests of the senators’ constituents generally
performed as expected.  Union, which is the private-sector unionization rate by state, is a
statistically significant determinant.  As expected, it is related negatively to votes in favor
of NAFTA.  Export ratio, which is the ratio of state employment in industries in which
the United States is a net exporter to state employment in industries in which the United
States in a net importer, is also a statistically significant determinant.  As expected, it is
related positively to votes in favor of NAFTA.  No high school degree, which is the
fraction of a state’s 25 and older population without a high school diploma, is not a
statistically significant determinant.  This measure of low skill workers is expected to be
related negatively to support for NAFTA; however, the estimates do not reveal this
expected relationship.  Finally, Textiles, which is the share of a state’s total employment
accounted for by its textiles industry, is a statistically significant determinant.  As
expected, larger shares of employment in textiles are associated with increased opposition
to NAFTA.12
In variant 2 I simply append my estimate of state support for additional trade
restrictions in 1992, which is listed in Table 3.  Support for restrictions is a statistically
significant determinant.  As expected, increased support for restrictions is related
negatively to support for NAFTA.
One consequence of simply appending my estimate of state support for additional
trade restrictions is that both contribution variables are no longer statistically significant.
In variant 3 I report results of a model that eliminates AFL-CIO, No high school degree,
and Textiles.  In this model the contribution variables are statistically significant.  More
noteworthy for my purposes is that fact that state support for additional trade restrictions
retains its statistical significance.
  
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, voting on trade-policy issues is likely to be related to the individual
preferences of the constituents that a legislator represents.  To date, however, in voting
model studies the preferences of the constituents were inferred based on their economic
interests rather than generated directly.  Using research by Scheve and Slaughter (2001a)
that generates information on individual trade-policy preferences, I produced estimates of
trade-policy preferences on a state-by-state basis for 1992 and 1996.  These estimates
utilized Scheve and Slaughter’s finding that lower levels of educational attainment are
associated with increased support for additional trade restrictions.
Using an average level of educational attainment for each state, I generated an
average probability by state of support for additional trade restrictions.  Because average
educational attainment in neighboring states is similar throughout the United States,
support for additional trade restrictions tends to cluster.  Generally speaking, states in the13
South have the highest levels of support for additional trade restrictions.  Another
generalization is that support for additional trade restrictions is lower in 1996 than in
1992.  A verdict on the usefulness of these estimates has yet to be delivered; however, in
the context of voting on NAFTA by U.S. Senators the estimates for 1992 yield plausible
results.14
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*These coefficient estimates and the associated standard errors (in parentheses) were
generated by Scheve and Slaughter (2001a).  See Table 3.3, Model 2; and Table 3.4,
Model 2.  The dependent variable is based on individual responses to a question about
U.S. trade policy.  This variable is defined such that 1 indicates an opinion favoring trade
restrictions and 0 indicates opposition.17
Table 2
Assumptions Underlying Calculation of Educational Attainment
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Table 3 -- Average Probability of Supporting Additional Trade Restrictions
Probability Using Average Educational Attainment (Rank)
State 1992 1996
Alabama 0.731   (5) 0.636   (5)
Alaska 0.682   (48) 0.567   (48)
Arizona 0.692   (41) 0.605   (21)
Arkansas 0.728   (6) 0.643   (3)
California 0.699   (36) 0.596   (28)
Colorado 0.677   (50) 0.561   (50)
Connecticut 0.685   (47) 0.567   (47)
Delaware 0.706   (27) 0.587   (37)
District of Columbia 0.672   (51) 0.555   (51)
Florida 0.705   (28) 0.609   (18)
Georgia 0.718   (11) 0.616   (14)
Hawaii 0.688   (42) 0.603   (24)
Idaho 0.710   (22) 0.599   (26)
Illinois 0.703   (29) 0.594   (31)
Indiana 0.724   (9) 0.618   (12)
Iowa 0.717   (12) 0.595   (29)
Kansas 0.685   (45) 0.583   (40)
Kentucky 0.740   (2) 0.644   (2)
Louisiana 0.726   (8) 0.636   (4)
Maine 0.710   (21) 0.610   (16)
Maryland 0.696   (38) 0.565   (49)
Massachusetts 0.685   (46) 0.568   (46)
Michigan 0.710   (20) 0.601   (25)
Minnesota 0.702   (30) 0.576   (43)
Mississippi 0.736   (4) 0.633   (6)
Missouri 0.713   (15) 0.599   (27)
Montana 0.706   (26) 0.594   (30)
Nebraska 0.700   (34) 0.589   (35)
Nevada 0.702   (31) 0.604   (22)
New Hampshire 0.687   (43) 0.580   (42)
New Jersey 0.692   (40) 0.586   (38)
New Mexico 0.702   (32) 0.622   (10)
New York 0.701   (33) 0.593   (32)
North Carolina 0.722   (10) 0.623   (8)
North Dakota 0.708   (23) 0.618   (13)
Ohio 0.712   (16) 0.603   (23)
Oklahoma 0.707   (24) 0.606   (19)
Oregon 0.696   (39) 0.590   (34)
Pennsylvania 0.714   (13) 0.609   (17)
Rhode Island 0.710   (19) 0.606   (20)
South Carolina 0.726   (7) 0.631   (7)
South Dakota 0.711   (18) 0.612   (15)
Tennessee 0.738   (3) 0.618   (11)
Texas 0.713   (14) 0.623   (9)
Utah 0.686   (44) 0.568   (45)
Vermont 0.700   (35) 0.583   (39)
Virginia 0.706   (25) 0.592   (33)
Washington 0.681   (49) 0.569   (44)
West Virginia 0.743   (1) 0.652   (1)
Wisconsin 0.711   (17) 0.588   (36)
Wyoming 0.699   (37) 0.581   (41)
Average of regions 0.706 0.60019
Table 4 -- Percentage Supporting/Opposing Additional Trade Restrictions
1992 1996
State Support Opposition Support Opposition
Alabama 95 5 82 18
A l a s k a 9 2 87 32 7
Arizona 91 9 80 20
Arkansas 95 5 85 15
California 92 8 73 27
Colorado 91 9 70 30
Connecticut 91 9 68 32
Delaware 93 7 73 27
District of Columbia 81 19 66 34
Florida 93 7 80 20
Georgia 94 6 78 22
Hawaii 93 7 76 24
Idaho 95 5 80 20
Illinois 92 8 76 24
Indiana 95 5 84 16
I o w a 9 5 57 92 1
K a n s a s 9 1 97 42 6
Kentucky 93 7 82 18
Louisiana 95 5 81 19
Maine 93 7 80 20
Maryland 90 10 68 32
Massachusetts 89 11 68 32
Michigan 93 7 79 21
Minnesota 95 5 74 26
Mississippi 97 3 83 17
Missouri 94 6 76 24
Montana 94 6 78 22
Nebraska 95 5 76 24
Nevada 94 6 81 19
New Hampshire 89 11 72 28
New Jersey 91 9 72 28
New Mexico 92 8 79 21
New York 90 10 74 26
North Carolina 95 5 79 21
North Dakota 94 6 80 20
O h i o 9 4 67 82 2
Oklahoma 94 6 80 20
Oregon 94 6 77 23
Pennsylvania 93 7 78 22
Rhode Island 91 9 76 24
South Carolina 95 5 82 18
South Dakota 95 5 79 21
Tennessee 95 5 81 19
Texas 93 7 78 22
U t a h 9 3 77 42 6
Vermont 92 8 73 27
Virginia 91 9 74 26
Washington 92 8 74 26
West Virginia 95 5 86 14
Wisconsin 94 6 76 24
Wyoming 94 6 76 24
Average of regions 93  7 77 2320
Table 5































































*     Statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level.
**   Statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level.
Source:  Variant 1: Baldwin and Magee (2000); Variants 2 and 3: author’s calculations.